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PROSPECTS OF THE VISEGRAD
COOPERATION IN CHANGING
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
CONDITIONS – IDENTIFYING CONVERGING
AND DIVERGING FACTORS
Judit Kiss1
Visegrad cooperation as an instrument
of the articulation of common interests
In the last two decades, the Visegrad cooperation proved its grounds.
In 2011, when the agreement celebrated its 20th anniversary, against
all sceptic voices the cooperation among Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary was in good shape. In spite of the weak
institutionalisation – until now the International Visegrad Fund is the
only joint institution – Visegrad cooperation exists and is visible,
meaning we can talk about a successful agreement that was estab-
lished in 1991.2 It is an important political interface to elaborate
strategies based on common interests or to discuss about bilateral
problems without any constraints. 
Due to the fact that cooperation is done among independent and
sovereign countries, a number of different and similar interests can
be articulated, so there are issues that weaken and others that
strengthen the agreement. The interrelations of the four countries
1 Research professor, senior advisor, Institute of World Economics – Centre for Economic and
Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
2 Szilágyiné Bátorfi, E., Conference address at: A visegrádi együttműködés 20 éve - Értéke-
lések, értelmezések. Budapest:Magyar Külügyi Intézet. 2011. február 17.
3 Hamberger (2010)
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have a historical determination to weaken the integration.3 Disagree-
ment was tangible during the history of the cooperation, because of
different political strategies in the member states; thus there were
successful and less successful periods.4 It also works against the co-
operation that most of the current issues of the Visegrad Group are
not being discussed systematically but are dealt with on an ad hoc
basis.5 Nonetheless, the cooperation had to face new and formerly
non-existing challenges during its recent history, that put the agree-
ment to the test, but cohesive forces seem to prevail among the V4
in the long term. In spite of some historically rooted conflicts, the
similar history and the geographical location6 connect these states
on several points. The perspective of the alliance can be seen as
determined by the necessity of closer cooperation in the social and
cultural fields, as well as of the articulation of common interests on
internal and external issues.7
2004 was a turning point for the V4, as the strategic goals of these
countries have been achieved, namely successfully joining NATO and
the European Union. Soon it seemed that the cooperation would lose
its relevance (by becoming a multilateral forum without any special
target). It seemed that the agreement was to become empty and
powerless, and many thought that the V4’s continued existence was
obsolete.8 Despite the political will to inject new aims into the coop-
eration, there was a diverging force that Poland, the largest member
of the agreement, because of its’ size played a more significant role
in the European Union than its Central European partners.9 It was
perceptible at the Ukrainian orange revolution in 2004 and the east
Ukrainian conflict in 2014, when Poland had a leading role within the
Visegrad countries (V4). But after a few years of EU membership –
partly due to some disillusionment and realisation that being a mem-
ber means a never ending compliance procedure – representation of
national and common regional interests came to the fore. Further en-
4 Šoth (2010); Strážay (2013); Walsch (2014)
5 Marek (2011)
6 Zelenická (2009); Brazova et al. (2013)
7 see more: Hamberger (2010); Walsh (2014)
8 Hamberger (2010)
9 Marek (2011)
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largement, new initiatives within the EU and the reform of the Union’s
common policies/structures gave new impetus to the V4 countries
to cooperate. 
Despite political turbulences, the agreement fulfilled its role: it was
the main forum for political dialogue and bilateral relations between
its member states. Similar or even better perspectives may await
the cooperation if its members recognise the benefits of joint ac-
tions. There are two dimensions of the Visegrad cooperation after
EU accession.10 On the one hand, the internal dimension means joint
internal programs (economic, infrastructure, trade, energy, invest-
ment, cultural and educational programs) and on the other hand, the
articulating of common interests in the EU decision-making mecha-
nisms as well as towards third countries. Concerning the latter as-
pect, it was a significant progress after 2004, that the V4 engaged
in transferring membership experiences to the Western Balkan
countries. Regarding the EU issues, at the debate of the 2014-2020
budget, Visegrad countries were successful in establishing a large
and thus influential “friends of cohesion” group11 successful in pre-
serving most of the acquis and financial background of cohesion
policy. However, a weak point of the cooperation is the lack of reg-
ular pre-discussion of national positions prior to Council negotia-
tions, as these countries prefer to enter ad hoc coalitions within the
Union.12 An example of this behaviour was the reform of the com-
mon agriculture policy where the Visegrad countries were not able
to agree on a united approach.13
All in all, the balance of the Visegrad cooperation is on the one side
a success story, on the other side – because of the weak institution-
alisation – it has its limits. However, lack of institutions means more
flexibility to respond to internal and external challenges.14 Therefore
this regional alliance has a unique opportunity – via coordination of
national politics – to create a more visible and more competitive Cen-
tral European region in the international context. Based on the history
10 Walsh (2014)
11 Vida (2012); Walsh (2014)
12 Köles (2011); Marek (2011); Vida (2012)
13 Šoth (2010)
14 Strážay (2013)
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of the Visegrad cooperation we can see that the operation and
prospects of this agreement should be examined in the context of
the regional and international issues. This research attempted to
analyse the effects of the changing internal and external environment
and to identify the main threats, challenges and possibilities regard-
ing V4 cooperation.
Aims of the research
The significance of the Visegrad cooperation has led to countless in-
terpretations (both academic papers and other articles) which are
mainly preoccupied by the opportunities it provides. Merely the bib-
liography that was published at the 20th anniversary of the coopera-
tion, contains approximately 1400 selected articles, books and
academic papers between 1991 and 2011 about the Visegrad. 
For researchers the following questions can be articulated in this
framework. How successful is the agreement in the context of chang-
ing economic circumstances with special regard to the anti-crisis
strategies and the post-crisis period? What are the main challenges
and tasks of the decision-makers? How can the political changes in-
side the EU and the V4 influence the future prospects of the agree-
ment? How can the V4 cooperation be influenced by such ideas as
a two speed Europe with a federal core area, and a confederal outer
band (non-euro countries)? What are the major challenges for the re-
gion in terms of social circumstances or trends? How do these trends
influence the competitiveness and sustainable catching up process
including productivity, human and physical infrastructure in these
countries? 
The main assumption is that dynamics and scope of the Visegrad
cooperation have been determined by the political, economic and
social development not only of the individual countries but of the EU
as the main anchor, as well as the changing global political and eco-
nomic environment. Our goal was next to draw up the main chal-
lenges facing the V4 countries and to find similarities and differences
regarding the economic, political and social issues. We did it because
in the last two decades the history of the Visegrad cooperation
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proved that it was driven by identified common interests.15 Therefore
the main aim of this research was to reveal in this frame of ref-
erence those cohesive (or centripetal) forces which drive to-
wards more cohesion and lead to deeper cooperation. At the
same time, we also attempted to uncover those diverging (or cen-
trifugal) forces which might weaken or halt cooperation. During the
research we kept in mind the practical use of our results therefore
we put forward recommendations for enhancing cooperation and
overcoming difficulties, solving arising problems. 
The research has three angles built on our basic concept. The first
angle of the project focuses on economic issues. The questions to
be answered are as follows:
– How can Visegrad countries reach a sustainable development, and
increase their competitiveness given the current external circum-
stances? 
– Is there a change as regards the basis for further economic devel-
opment in the post-crisis period? 
– Have public finances been stabilised in a sustainable manner or
will further pressures come to the surface?
The second research angle tries to catch the crucial political fields
for the future cooperation among V4 countries. 
– How can the V4 represent and enforce its interests vis-à-vis the
general developments of the European Union (e.g. two-speed Eu-
rope, common EU budget, etc.)? 
– What is the potential for the Visegrad group to represent national
and common regional interests in the EU’s decision-making
processes?
The third issue deals with the social challenges facing the V4. Suffi-
cient quantity and quality of labour, and ageing society are among
the major challenges for the whole Europe. Adequate social devel-
opment is one of the key prerequisites of sustainable economic de-
velopment and public finances (taxes, social insurance etc.). 
15 See among others: Pastwa (2014); Rácz (2014)
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– How can sustainable social structures be built up and enhance
overall competitiveness in the Visegrad countries? 
First we summarise the main results of the country studies high-
lighting the main similarities and differences in order to show the pos-
sible cooperation linkages between the V4 countries. For all pillars
we completed a SWOT analysis based on the main internal and ex-
ternal trends. Finally, we draw up the prospective future direction of
the cooperation and formulate recommendations to the decision-
makers.
Economic pillar
Convergence and sustainable
catching up process – partially successful
In today's global economy the emergence of the countries depends
even more on the opportunities from their external economic rela-
tions as well as on their internal adaptability to respond to external
challenges. In this context, regarding the economic ties, the changing
global environment provides the framework. In the case of the Viseg-
rad region this phenomenon is even more important, because the
three smaller countries are highly open economies (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia) with 75-95% of exports to GDP ratio, reflect-
ing a greater vulnerability to external market developments. Poland
with its big domestic market has less than 50% export to GDP ratio,
which plays a key role in the differences among the V4 countries. The
V4 have been showing significant development in their foreign trade:
while between 1990 and 2012 the volume of world trade has tripled,
the external trade turnover of the Visegrad countries was ten times
bigger.
While the V4 countries are far (by 15-20 percentage points) more
integrated into the EU market than the EU average (61.8% in 2013)16,
some geographical reorientation of exports has been taken place
in the V4, too, especially since the crisis (mainly in the direction of
Russia, Ukraine, China and Turkey).
16 Vida (2015b)
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According to the statistical data, the economic development of the
Visegrad countries in the last ten years was mainly determined by the
impact of EU accession, the effect of the financial and economic cri-
sis, and the outcome of crisis management. In analysing the economic
situation of the V4, three stages of development could be identified:
the post-accession and pre-crisis years (2004-2008) of diverging but
mostly improving macroeconomic trends, especially in Poland, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia; the crisis years (2009-2013) of reces-
sion, stagnation or low growth, and finally the post-crisis years (2014
and beyond) marked by harmonious converging trends. As regards
GDP figures, in spite of diverging growth rates right after accession
and in the years of the crisis, by 2014 the growth rates of V4 have
converged to around 2-3%. Though in the coming years the high pre-
crisis dynamism will not return to the region, a continuation of catching
up to the EU could be envisaged due to the above-EU-average ex-
pected growth rates (2.2-3.8% vs. 1.3-1.9% until 2019).17 The main
drivers of growth will be (remain) domestic demand (especially invest-
ment, and public and private consumption to a certain degree), net
exports (especially in the smaller countries) and EU funds equalling
135 billion euro in the 2014-2020 period. As the Visegrad countries’
economy highly depends on the EU, especially in the field of foreign
trade and financial resources (FDI, funds, remittances), their future
economic trends cannot be separated that of the EU.
Catching up at regional level shows a similar picture to national
performances: the most spectacular development took place in
NUTS-2 regions of Slovakia and Poland, while the Czech and espe-
cially the Hungarian regions did not experience a similar closing up.
However, in all countries there is a huge discrepancy in development
levels between the central regions (reaching well above 100% of EU
average) and the rest being below 75%.18 This problem is the gravest
in the smallest but the most dynamically catching up country (Slova-
kia), confirming the trade-off theory of convergence. 
As regards the convergence of living standards measured by per
capita GDP, both the beta and sigma convergence theories were val-
17 Vida (2015b)
18 Vida (2015b)
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idated by our research results: poorer countries (like Slovakia) man-
aged to reach higher growth rates, consequently the gap narrowed
among the Visegrad countries as well as between the V4 and the EU
average. As a consequence of wage convergence, by 2012 the net
annual earnings of the V4 average (6,350 euro) reached one third of
the EU average instead of one fourth in the year of accession.19 How-
ever, price convergence happened significantly faster. 
All in all, the V4 countries did converge to each other and to the
EU, mainly due to the very quick catching up of the less developed
countries, namely Slovakia and Poland. While at the accession the
Slovak GDP per capita in PPS stood at 57% of the EU average, by
2013 it reached 75%. The same figures for Poland were 48% and
67%, respectively. In contrast to the 18-19 percentage point con-
vergence of the two less developed countries, the two more devel-
oped countries' convergence was only 3 percentage point in the
case of the Czech Republic and 4 percentage point in the case of
Hungary, that is these countries performed below their potential. The
convergence within the Visegrad group is proved by the fact that
while at accession the difference between the most and the least
developed country in term of GDP per capita in PPS was around 30
percentage point, by 2013 this difference has halved.20 As a conse-
quence of the above convergence, the ranking of the countries
changed: though the Czech Republic managed to keep its leading
position, Slovakia and even Poland overtook Hungary due to the di-
verse economic structures and the different impact of the economic
crisis. It looks like that divergence within the V4 will slow down, how-
ever it will be a long way to bring all countries and all regions at least
to the 75% of the EU. 
Apart from quantitative changes, remarkable qualitative i.e. struc-
tural changes could be revealed: while in the 1990s Visegrad coun-
tries were mainly competitive in labour intensive industries and had
disadvantages in technology-driven industries, during the last
decade the share of high-technology products in total exports has
increased significantly, showing a catching-up to the developed
19 Vida (2015b)
20 Bartovic (2015)
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countries. The Czech Republic and Hungary are in a leading position
with 15.0 and 16.1% shares (2013), respectively, while Slovakia and
Poland are lagging behind with 9.6% and 6.7% shares.21 As in the
case of Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic high technology
exports grew more dynamically than total exports, in Hungary high-
tech export growth was below the overall export dynamics due to
multinational-network reorganisations, signalling that corporate de-
cisions affect the external performance of the countries. The increas-
ing share of the V4 in the global value chain means that in the 21st
century national competitiveness cannot be separated from the com-
petitiveness of transnational firms.
Cleaning up public finances
– consolidation without real structural changes
Public finances in the post-crisis period are being successfully sta-
bilised, however consolidation was not accompanied by thorough
structural reform of the national budgets. Sound public finances are
not only an obligation under the Maastricht criteria but also building
blocks of a country's competitiveness.22 The Visegrad countries en-
tered the EU with differing levels of budget deficit. While the improv-
ing trends of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland were
disrupted by the crisis, Hungary was hit by it in the middle of fiscal
policy ‘repair’. Thus Hungary was the first to leave the excessive
deficit procedure in 2013 (after ten years of being under EDP), fol-
lowed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Regarding Poland, as
neither the 2012 nor the 2014 deadline were kept, a new deadline
was set up for 2015.23 The promising consolidation processes in all
four countries seem to keep budget deficits under 3% also in the
medium run, while the public debt ratios remained below 60% in
three of them, and the high Hungarian rate has been converging to-
wards the Maastricht threshold in the recent years. 
While the V4 countries have been focusing on decreasing their
deficits, no major structural reforms were adopted. This is especially
21 Túry (2014)
22 Vida (2015b)
23 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014), pp. 7-8.
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true in the case of Hungary and Slovakia where public revenues in-
creased, and expenditures were not cut back. 
Table 1. Total general government revenues and expenditures
as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
Source: Eurostat
Looking at the monetary developments since accession, after di-
vergences in the pre-crisis years, very promising converging trends
can be detected in the post-crisis period. There is recently a clear
convergence of both inflation rates (forecasted to be around 1-3%
in the medium run) and of long-term interest rates (thanks to system-
atic base rate cuts in Poland and Hungary) Stabilising public fi-
nances, keeping the rules on fiscal discipline, approaching to and
sustaining nominal and real convergence plus implementing some
structural reforms (e.g. in the field of the labour market, business en-
vironment, transport infrastructure, innovation etc.) may result in the
introduction of the euro at the beginning of the next decade in the
case of the three bigger Visegrad countries. A common joining would
be desirable, however, the societies should be prepared for the
change, also public and political support should be strengthened.
Revenues
2004 2010 2004-2013 in pp.
European Union (27 countries) 43.8 44.1 2.0
Czech Republic 40.4 39.1 0.5
Hungary 42.6 45.6 5.1
Poland 37.2 37.5 0.3
Slovakia 35.3 32.3 0.6
Expenditures
2004 2010 2004-2013 in pp.
European Union (27 countries) 46.7 50.6 2.4
Czech Republic 43.3 43.7 -1.0
Hungary 49.1 50.0 0.9
Poland 42.6 45.4 -0.7
Slovakia 37.7 39.8 1.0
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The SWOT analysis based on the main macroeconomic trends in
the Visegrad countries for the time horizon of 202224 shows that the
common strengths of the V4 countries are: growth, low inflation, in-
terest rate convergence, consolidated public finances, strong attrac-
tion of FDI, good trade performance and current account balance.
Future opportunities are provided by continued convergence to EU
averages, harmonious development at V4 level, rising domestic de-
mand, attraction of FDI, good manufacturing and export potential,
diversification of export markets and use of EU funds. The main
weaknesses are in the field of investment, productivity, innovation
and regional development. Potential threats are partly external, such
as low growth of main export partners, and partly internal such as
the exchange rate vulnerability with the exception of Slovakia, or the
net income outflows.
Political pillar
Western linkages – the European environment
Governance issues have always been on the agenda of European
integration, just like the permanent struggle between the federalists
and the intergovernmentalists. From the early 1990s onwards – start-
ing with the Maastricht treaty, through the Amsterdam and Nice
treaties – up until the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, gov-
ernance modes became increasingly complex and less transparent. A
great challenge was the historical enlargement and the fact that not
all member states were willing and/or able to participate in all projects
of European integration. As a response, innovative ideas on a two-tier
EU and the re-emergence of federalism came into the fore. 
Governance issues became recently intertwined with the tackling
of the global crisis. In 2009 the most serious financial and economic
crisis ever hit the European Union. The crisis has actually been exer-
cising two parallel impacts on the integration: a centripetal one, push-
ing for deeper cooperation and a centrifugal one, working in the other
direction i.e. finding other types of breaking points to ensure eco-
nomic growth. In practice, the EU applied mixed methods and instru-
24 Vida (2015b)
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ments to tackle the crisis and there has been a boom of new institu-
tions, legislation and financial tools proposed/created. The cen-
tripetal and centrifugal forces became visible. On the one hand, all
the member states were united to manage the crisis and work to-
gether (e.g. European Semester, Europe 2020 Strategy, Six-pack,
Two-pack, Deposit Guarantee Scheme), while on the other hand,
there were initiatives not supported by all member states (Euro Plus
Pact, Fiscal Compact) and not involving everybody (European Sta-
bility Mechanism Treaty, Single Surveillance Mechanism). 
The measures are an obvious mixture and patchwork of the Com-
munity and the so-called Union methods leading to less transparency
and accountability, and making the economic and fiscal policy gov-
ernance extremely complex and bureaucratic. Based on the intro-
duced measures and advocated proposals, and taking into account
the actual political and economic situation and citizens’ perception,
Vida (2015a) distinguishes four possible scenarios for EU governance.
A federation of states with clearer delimitation of competences and
more subsidiarity. The two-tier EU for the euro area would be further
institutionalised within the EU institutions and also within the financing
system. The third scenario could be streamlined and flexible EU; in
some areas the way competences are exercised would be revised.
The last scenario is the preserving of the current status quo. 
Visegrads’ different positions 
In several fields the Visegrad countries have a shared position (e.g.
in cohesion policy financing, interconnection of transport and energy
networks, Eastern partnership, increasing competitiveness, fostering
economic growth, energy security etc.), however in other areas they
have different attitudes determined by their economic and political
situation.
Poland – which weathered the crisis well thanks to responsive do-
mestic economic policy – has been supportive for all anti-crisis meas-
ures taken by the EU (like European Semester, Euro plus Pact, the
Stability and Growth Pact (Six-pack), Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)),
while favouring a strengthened economic governance and deeper in-
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tegration. As the country's main endeavour is to avoid any “second-
class” membership, to accede to the inner circle of EU decision-mak-
ing and to become a big player, Poland acceded to all new
institutions and instruments.
Poland signed the Euro plus Pact in order to prevent the further
deepening of a two-speed European integration, to be part of the
changes and to cooperate with eurozone members. Concerning the
Six-pack – which was adopted under Polish presidency in November
2011 – Poland supported SGP reform, however, it opted for “more
flexible” way to achieve the SGP requirements and strongly opposed
the Commission's proposal of fines for non-euro members breaching
SGP rules in the form of withholding EU funds.25
Poland position is that there is a need to deepen integration, to
make European institutions stronger and to complete the EMU via
steps towards a full banking, economic, fiscal and political union.
However, there is a fear that the different EU actions might result in
fragmentation of the EU or in several speeds of the EU.26
In the Czech Republic there was a nation-wide consensus on full
political support to becoming a member of the European Union. Sup-
port for EU membership was the highest during the Czech presidency
in 2009, then it started to drop quickly as a consequence of crisis in
the EU and the euro area. Nowadays the Czech Republic is consid-
ered to be a eurosceptic country and an unpredictable and irrespon-
sible partner (see the example of the long delay in ratifying the Lisbon
Treaty), finding itself in the position of an outsider.27 Regarding the EU
relations of the Czech Republic – pro or against deepening integration
– we can observe a clear correlation with different political directions,
at the level of both, ruling parties and the president of the country.
The Czech Republic has been sceptical about the EU’s new crisis
management methods and the further deepening of the integration
process, especially under the centre-right government. This passive
wait and see strategy, accompanied by the outright eurosceptic view
25 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014)
26 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2014)
27 Bartovic (2014)
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of the former president, Mr. Vaclav Klaus, marginalised the Czech Re-
public in the EU and resulted in the country's abstention from both
the Euro Plus Pact in 2011 and the Fiscal Compact in 2012. The new
coalition government appointed in January 2014 declared a pro-EU
policy and adopted a new EU strategy with an aim to become a fixed
part of the EU. The current Czech president, Miloš Zeman considers
himself a “European federalist”, he pledges for quick introduction of
the euro and for the country's participation in core Europe. As a sign
of change, the new government signed the Fiscal Compact and sent
it to the parliament for ratification. 
The Czech position towards changes in the EU governance means
“a gradual acceptance of the multi-speed or even multi-level model
of EU integration on the condition of relative openness of the euro-
zone towards other EU member states”.28
Slovakia, as a euro-member since 2009, does not have any choice
but to join all new structures and instrument of the Economic and
Monetary Union. The Fiscal Compact came into force in January 2013
and the newly established Council for Budget Responsibility is dealing
with overall fiscal health, including the issue of budget deficit and pub-
lic debt. In order to comply with the Fiscal Compact, Slovakia contin-
ues fiscal consolidation and makes efforts to fight against tax evasion,
improve VAT collection and broaden the tax base. The primary focus
of the Euro Plus Pact, namely competitiveness, employment, sustain-
ability of public finances, financial stability and coordination of tax
policies, are particularly important for Slovakia.
Concerning the fiscal union, Slovakia emphasises its clear objec-
tions. Lack of coordination and political will are weakening the legit-
imacy of the agreement. The fiscal union is almost solely driven by
the expenditure side of public finances, the revenue side (like taxes)
is underrepresented. Slovakia is for a gradual tax harmonisation, as
recently the differing tax rates and separate levies at national levels
are functioning as an element of “fiscal competition”.29 Finally Slova-
kia finds that there are institutional problems with enforcement of
28 Bartovic (2014), p. 18.
29 Hošoff (2014a)
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rules, and the collective guarantees for debts have many risks. All in
all, Slovakia strives to maintain the country’s place in the mainstream
of the EU.
Hungary has so far had a mixed approach. The country is fully in
favour of the Six-pack and Two-pack, and has always been commit-
ted to all the reforms taken in the framework of the existing treaties
and institutions. At the same time, Hungary is more cautious about
any new measures outside the Treaty framework. Hungary did not
sign the Euro Plus Pact (along with the Czech Republic, Great Britain
and Sweden) because of its references to tax harmonisation, while
Budapest is willing to join the coordination on the other aspects of
the Pact. This step however was in line with the government’s slogan
of national independence and emphasis on national sovereignty.
However, in order to avoid a reinforced outsider position and to show
commitment to sound public finances, Hungary actually signed the
Fiscal Compact (but most of its provisions will be binding only upon
its accession to the eurozone). 
It can be concluded that the attitudes of the Visegrad countries
in connection with the key anti-crisis instruments are different and
non-homogenous. While the Europe 2020 Strategy, the European
Semester, the Six-pack, the Two-pack, and the EU wide institutions
for monitoring financial markets (e.g. the European Banking Authority)
were accepted by all V4 countries, the Fiscal Compact was signed
only by Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The Euro Plus Pact was ac-
cepted by Poland and Slovakia, while the European Stability Mech-
anism was signed by Slovakia only, as a member of the eurozone.30
Eastern linkages – Russian relations
The Central European countries can be defined geopolitically by their
relations to Western Europe and by Eastern Europe’s (i.e. Russia’s)
interests towards them.31 Therefore the future cooperation of the
Visegrad countries depends not only on their position in the Euro-
pean Union but on their relation with Russia and its interests. It makes
30 For details see Vida (2015a)
31 Huntington (1996)
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the situation complex that the relations of Central Europe and Russia
have a quite turbulent past.32 Nowadays, the strategic leverages of
Russia over the whole region are smaller than they were in the Soviet
times. With the Soviet Union falling apart, Central Europe has no
common border with Russia, the Red Army was withdrawn, the War-
saw Pact ceased to exist, the Visegrad countries have joined and in-
tegrated into the NATO and the EU, the pro-Moscow elites were
ousted from power and there are no significant ethnic Russian mi-
norities living in Central Europe. In the post-1989 period Central Eu-
rope needed to be concerned only of the soft power potential of
Russia (used in the case of energy business), but not of any direct
hard security threat. This period came to a quick end by the Russian
occupation of the Crimea in March 2014. 
Though the Visegrad countries share a common interest related to
Ukraine as a neighbouring country, they are very much divided on
Russia. Both normative and policy differences are discernible. Speak-
ing about the normative differences, Poland has a traditionally very
strong Trans-Atlantic commitment, taking hard stance on Russia. The
very Russia-critical position of the Czech Republic is based on its
focus on human rights. Slovakia and Hungary are much more prag-
matic. Besides, Hungary under the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is
continuing its eurosceptic, more East-oriented policy track.
In military terms, though the Russian troops are fighting a war in
Ukraine, there is no any direct military threat to the Visegrad region,
which is protected by the NATO membership. Regarding energy se-
curity, all countries are highly dependent on Russian gas supply to
varying degrees. The Czech Republic is the least dependent with a
66% share in all gas imports. Hungary and Poland receive 81% and
83% of their gas imports from Russia, while the ratio for Slovakia is
93%. Both Poland and Slovakia are key transit countries, and the
Czech Republic also plays a transit role. Hence, these countries are
protected by their transit position, while Hungary is perhaps the most
vulnerable country. Visegrad countries are jointly pursuing a number
32 Rácz (2014)
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of energy projects. As none of them are completed, they could not
provide an umbrella against unwanted supply breaks or punitive
measures of Russia. In economic terms Poland has the most to lose
if Russia reacts with economic counter-measures to EU sanctions.
However, the other three Visegrad countries are engaged in a number
of large politically-driven projects which might be at stake. 
As a result of the above mentioned differences, the Visegrad group
has been unable to adopt a common position on Russia. The V4 is
very much divided about how to react to Russia’s actions in Ukraine
(take the example of EU sanctions). However, one should not forget
that increasing intra-Visegrad tensions belongs to the tactics of the
Russian foreign and security policy aimed at weakening the EU and
NATO.33 According to one of the possible scenarios, if the Visegrad
countries could be able to form a common position on Ukraine and
Russia, their visibility and prestige would be boosted. A common
Visegrad voice could be better heard in the EU, as the four countries
have the same 58 votes in the Council like Germany and France have
together. Moreover, a coherent Visegrad position on Russia could
turn the V4 into a more valuable and reliable partner of the USA.
However, differences between the V4 are far deeper than occasional,
hence it is unlikely that a common Visegrad position could be formed.
Another theoretical – though unlikely – option is that due to the
deepening lack of trust between the countries, the cooperation gets
halted or suspended. The most likely scenario is that the V4 will re-
main unable to form a common position about Russia, however, co-
operation will continue due to the “art of disagreeing” rule, meaning
that if consensus cannot be reached on a certain issue, then the
problem is put aside and cooperation continues on those areas
where a joint position can be agreed on. The existence and the ac-
tivity of the International Visegrad Fund as the primary foreign policy
arm of the V4 cooperation might be a guarantee for not suspending
cooperation. 
33 “A small Central European country can never be more for Russia than a useful weak point
inside the EU and NATO, and also in the Visegrad co-operation.” Rácz (2014) p. 15.
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Social pillar
Social changes occur at a slower pace than economic changes.
However, they provide a basis for the competitiveness of each econ-
omy and its ability to develop. Therefore it is vital to give a clear pic-
ture about the present situation, to identify possible risks and
challenges in order to prepare appropriate responses and policy-ori-
ented actions.
Europe 2020, the European Union strategy for growth and employ-
ment, was adopted in 2010. It emphasizes smart, sustainable and in-
clusive growth with special regard to social inclusion aiming at
fostering job creation and poverty reduction. Apart from these two
measures the social situation and living standards of the V4 countries
are determined by demographic trends, real wages, income distri-
bution, education, health care, pensions, social protection, migration
etc. To meet the overall EU targets, member states have set up their
own national targets in their national reform programmes. Therefore
the structure of the country reports focuses on this development
strategy.
Demographic trends
The demographic trends of the Visegrad countries are quite similar
to those of the EU countries. The V4are also characterized by declin-
ing and/or negative population growth rates caused by decreasing
fertility rates and changing reproductive behaviours. If trends continue
the population of the Visegrad countries will actually decrease, unless
large-scale immigration is not considered (envisaged). Because of
population decrease migration trends have a significant role in the
Visegrad countries. In the case of Poland and Hungary migration is
dominated by an increasing trend motivated mostly by economic rea-
sons.  The result of emigration is the inflow of remittances and com-
pensations which can improve the current account balance of the
countries; however, emigration might cause labour shortages in cer-
tain occupations. In contrast to this, the migration trend in the Czech
Republic is dominated by immigration, resulting in a positive migration
balance. The V4 countries are not destinations for each other with the
exception of the Czech Republic for the highly educated segment of
the Slovak workforce. In the future there will be an increasing need in
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all the Visegrad countries to promote immigration for counterbal-
ancing natural population decline and the ageing of the society. 
Life expectancy is increasing due to decreasing mortality rates,
higher living standards, better nutrition and easier access to health
services. The consequences are: progressive ageing, decreasing
working-age population and an increasing dependency ratio. The
main associated challenge is the sustainability of the pension and
health care systems.
The 38 million-strong Polish population is also slowly declining and
is expected to be 32 million in 2050 if current trends do not change.
The negative population growth rate is due to a low birth rate – caused
by a low fertility rate – and continued emigration of young people. Em-
igration from Poland has increased significantly since accession: from
1 million to above 2.1 million in 2012. Around 78% of emigrants
stayed abroad 12 months or longer. Large number of emigrants have
also had a positive effect on the current account balance of the coun-
try, because Poland is the third biggest EU country in terms of work-
ers’ remittance inflows. However, one should not forget the negative
impact of emigration, namely wage pressure and labour shortage in
specific fields, i.e., construction, health care and retail trade.34
Life expectancy is continuously increasing: nonetheless there is a
vast gap in life expectancy between Poland and western EU coun-
tries. The Polish population is aging fast: by 2060 34.5% of Poles will
be aged 65 or more. This means that a decreasing number of workers
will have to care for an increasing number of pensioners, with a detri-
mental effect on the pension system. As a solution, Poland would
have to have an inflow of at least 5 million immigrants by 2050, though
the country is not ready to become a non-homogenous society.35
In 2014 the Czech Republic had a population of 10.5 million, the
highest number since the country’s independence in 1993, largely due
to the positive migration balance. Between 2002 and 2013 net migration
amounted to 353 thousand, which is 3.4% of the total population. The
strong influx of immigrants was mostly the result of the country’s ac-
cession to the EU, entry to the Schengen zone and strong economic
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growth causing labour force shortages. Despite the positive figures, ac-
cording to projections36 a significant population decrease is expected
until 2100, resulting in a population between 6.1 and 9.1 million.  The
negative population trends can be counterbalanced by the country’s
positive migration balance. According to projections, the proportion of
the working age population will fall until the end of the century. In the
meantime there will be progressive ageing as the share of persons aged
65 and above will increase from today’s one-sixth to one-third of the
population. The dependency ratio will reach 100 per cent in mid-cen-
tury: this means that the number of those in the productive population
(20-64 years) will equal the sum of the number of people under 20 and
above 65.Increasingthe retirement age would affect this trend. 
The Slovak population size is around 5.4 million and is moving lightly
upwards due to an increasing birth rate and a stagnating death rate.
However, the size of the population is projected to decrease below 4
million by 2070 should sizeable immigration and/or a strong pro-family
policy not occur. Slovakia is the only country from the V4 where mi-
gration did not play a significant role: it affects only some ten thousand
persons. Slovakia is the only Visegrad country where immigration has
always exceeded emigration, which was curbed by the crisis in the
EU. However, the health sector suffers from the emigration of profes-
sionals. Between 2004 and 2009 2.800 doctors moved abroad, which
is 15% of the total staff. While emigration is not currently an issue in
Slovakia, in the future the country could rely more on immigrants as a
substitute for the decreasing domestic labour supply. 
Increasing life expectancy leads to an ageing society and an in-
creasing dependency ratio. Recently Slovakia had the lowest de-
pendency ratio in the whole EU (below 20%). However, there will a
dramatic shift in the coming decades resulting in the highest depend-
ency ratio (almost 70%) by 2080.
The Hungarian population has been decreasing for decades by
35-40 thousand persons per year due mainly to the decreasing birth
rate and declining number of marriages. In 2014 the Hungarian pop-
ulation dropped below 10 million and is expected to be 7.33 million
in 2060. Hungary does not attract enough foreigners to counterbal-
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ance population decrease. Emigration outnumbers immigration,
though there is no reliable data on the former. According to official
statistics for the first quarter of 2014 only 95 thousand persons left
the country, though unofficial sources speak of between 300 and 500
thousand. In accordance with the general migration trend, mainly
young educated people leave the country, hence leading to labour
shortages in certain professions, especially in the heath care sector. 
Labour market trends 
Though the labour market situation has improved in the V4 coun-
tries since the crisis, unemployment – with special regard to youth
and long term unemployment – is still a challenge for all the countries
with the exception of the Czech Republic. A special common prob-
lem is the high unemployment of the unskilled labour force and un-
employment in less developed regions. Another general problem for
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is the low employment and activity
rate (63.2%, 64.9% and 65.0%, respectively in 2013), especially in
the case of women. In order to handle the above problems, active
labour market measures should be adopted and the adjustment of
the educational systems to labour market demands is required.
One of the indicators for inclusive growth is the employment rate.
According to Europe 202037 the headline target for the whole EU was
set at 75% of the population aged 20-64. The Polish target is 71%,
while the actual figure for 2013 was around 65%, compared to the
EU average of 68.5%. In the Czech Republic the employment rate
(73.5% in 2014) is the highest among the Visegrad countries and is
well above the EU average: the 2020 target is 75%. The Slovak tar-
get is 72%, which is very ambitious as the current figure is around
65%. Hungary has the lowest figures among the V4 countries with
its 62.5%: the 2020 target number is 75%.
As regards employment figures between accession and the crisis
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, employment went up
and unemployment fell to historically low levels, while the Hungarian
figures went into the opposite direction due to mismanagement of
the economy. Though the crisis broke the positive trends in the three
37 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/18_employment_target.pdf
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former countries, labour market recovery has already started and un-
employment rates show a converging trend. By 2016 only Slovakia
is expected to have a two-digit unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate in Poland was 10.3% at the end of 2013,
which is very close to the EU average. The long term unemployment
rate decreased substantially between 2004 and 2012 (from 10.3% to
4.1%) compared to the EU average of around 10%.38 In the beginning
of 2015 the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic was 5.5%,
which is the third lowest in the EU after Germany and Austria. Con-
sequently, unemployment does not mean a burden for the Czech
economy: it is mainly a regional problem and affects primarily non-
qualified workers and certain disadvantaged groups of society.
In Slovakia unemployment is one of the most significant challenges,
requiring reform of active labour market policies. The employment sit-
uation is strongly influenced by the level of attained education. Be-
tween 2000 and 2013 the highest unemployment rate (between
40-50%) was prevalent in the case of people with primary or less than
primary education, and the Roma population. The employability of
people with upper-secondary and post-secondary education im-
proved, especially after accession, while the unemployment rate for
people with higher education increased, like in Poland and Hungary,
entailing a mismatch between education and employability. Though
long-term unemployment rates decreased after accession, in 2013 it
was around 10%, the same as the EU average, with significant regional
differences caused by uneven development among regions. 
In Hungary the number of active unemployed increased consider-
ably after accession (from 252 thousand to 449 thousand by 2013)
and the unemployment rate stood at 10.2% in 2013 as opposed to
6.1% in 2004. The number of young (under 25 years of age) unem-
ployed reached 84 thousand in 2013 while it was 56 thousand in
2004. In May 2014 the labour market situation significantly improved:
the unemployment rate dropped to 7.9% (355 thousand) and the
number of unemployed youth was 65 thousand. At the same time the
share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment was 49.5%,
which is higher than the EU average. 
38 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
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Education
The smart growth objective of the Europe 2020 strategy is closely re-
lated to education, which is one of the most important investments
individuals and societies can make in the future. To assess the state
of education four quantitative indicators were used.39 The most im-
portant concerns keeping students in the educational system, there-
fore the first goal is to reduce the rate of early school leaving.
Increasing the number/ratio of students in secondary education and
tertiary education is also a target. Increasing the number of the stu-
dents and giving them competitive knowledge entails investigating
input into the education system in the form of public expenditure on
education. On the output side PISA test scores were taken for qual-
itative assessment.
The performance of the V4 countries in the field of education
varies. The share of early school leavers is below the EU average in
the Czech Republic (5.4%), Poland (5.6%) and Slovakia (6.4%). Early
school leaving is of particular importance as this phenomenon nega-
tively affects productivity and competitiveness and contributes to
poverty and social exclusion. 
In the case of secondary education, the percentage of the popu-
lation that has attained at least upper-secondary education was
higher than the EU average in all V4 countries.40 Slovakia is above
90% and Poland and the Czech Republic are around 90% while Hun-
gary has the lowest figures (83.5%)
The proportion of population aged 30-34 with tertiary education is
highest in Poland (40.5%) and lowest in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia. As regards tertiary education in 2010, in the EU-27 19.8 million
students, that is 62.7% of all persons aged 20-24, are enrolled in
higher education. According to the Europe 2020 strategy by 2020 the
share of 30-34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment should
be at least 40% in the EU compared to 35.8% in 2012. In Poland this
indicator was 39.1% in 2012, while the national target is 45%. Slovakia
39 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-_edu-
cation
40 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Upper_secondary_or_terti-
ary_educational_attainment_and_early_leavers_from_education_and_training,_2007_and_2012
_%281%29_%28%25%29_YB14_I.png
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is among the worst performers with around a 20% share. In Poland in
2010 more than 2 million students were registered, which is one of the
highest figures in the EU. The overall Polish and Czech achievements
are generally better and above the EU average. In the field of educa-
tion, achievements by Poland are in general better than the EU-27 av-
erage, especially in the case of early school leavers and tertiary
educational attainment.41 While Slovakia is catching up, the Hungarian
situation is deteriorating. In all countries there is an urgent need for re-
thinking the profile of higher education in order to better meet the
labour market demands and to boost lifelong learning. Regarding ex-
penditure on education42 Slovakia has the worst figures. With the
spending of the 4.06% of the GDP in 2011 is the weakest position
among the V4 and the far away from the EU figures (5.25%). Poland
earmarks 4.94%, followed by Hungary at 4.71% and the Czech Re-
public at 4.51%. Regarding trends of government spending on edu-
cation, Hungary is considerably lower than the EU average and more
than 1.0 percentage point lower than at the time of accession. Hungary
is one of the two member states (the other country is Portugal) which
spent less money on education in 2012 than in 2004.
Income distribution and poverty
Income distribution does not show a uniform picture in the V4. The
most egalitarian countries are Slovakia and the Czech Republic,
Poland occupies a middle position with an improving tendency, while
the Hungarian situation is deteriorating.
In Poland income distribution, as measured by the Gini index, is
relatively equal and shows a decreasing tendency (from 35.6 in 2005
to 30.9 in 2012) due to the fast growth of the lowest salaries and the
fact that the richest citizens earn more but pay more taxes. Poland
occupies a middle position among the EU countries.43 In the Czech
Republic income distribution is very even in comparison with other
EU countries. The Gini coefficient was 24.6 in 2013, which is the third
lowest in the EU after Slovenia and Slovakia. The Slovak Republic
41 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
42 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ_figdp&lang=en
43 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
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has the lowest dispersion of national income among the Visegrad
countries and the declining Gini coefficient is lower than the EU av-
erage (below 25% in 2013). Income differences are closely related to
attained level of education (the higher the level of education, the
higher the income) and the location of the workplace reflects increas-
ing regional differences. In Hungary the Gini coefficient reached 28
in 2013, entailing an unequal distribution.44 Between 2010 and 2013
the upper 10% of the population had gained the most: income distri-
bution became more unequal.
The risk of poverty and social exclusion decreased in all V4
countries with the exception of Hungary, where it increased since the
crisis. The most significant decline occurred in Poland, while the Slo-
vak and especially the Czech rates are below the EU average and
among the lowest in the EU. However, even in these well-performing
countries certain strata of society, i.e., uneducated and unemployed
inhabitants, Roma population, children and single persons are still
vulnerable. Altogether in the V4 in 2013 15.6 million people, that is
12.7% of the EU28 population were at risk of poverty.
Regarding the trends of the social marginalization, the situation in
Poland has been improving uninterruptedly (even in the years of cri-
sis) along all indicators; consequently the social exclusion rate de-
creased substantially. With a rate of 26.7% in 2012 it is still a bit
above the EU average and concerns around 10 million people.
Women and young people experience a greater risk of poverty. The
goal for Poland is to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty
by 1.5 million compared to 2008. As regards monetary poverty,
Poland was one the worst performing EU countries in 2012 with a
rate of 17.1%, in contrast to the Czech Republic where the relevant
rate was 9.8%. The high monetary poverty rate is due to the fact that
a relatively small part (9%) of gross public transfers paid to house-
holds goes to the poorest citizens. Despite a significant decrease, in
2012 5.1 million people, 13.5% of the Polish population was still se-
verely materially deprived and almost 7% were living in households
with very low work intensity.45
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In the Czech Republic the percentage of population at the risk of
poverty and social exclusion decreased to 14.6 per cent by 2013,
which is the lowest figure in the EU. However, people with lower ed-
ucation, without jobs and family, let alone the Roma-populated com-
munities have higher risks of poverty. The poverty rate is significantly
influenced by social transfers. In 2011 the Czech government
adopted the Social Inclusion Strategy 2014-2020 with a main aim of
fighting against poverty.  
In Slovakia the social exclusion rate decreased significantly, from
32% in 2005 to 19.8% in 2013, which is below the EU average of
24.7%. The situation is not so bright in the case of children below the
age of 6 years and the Roma population (8% of Slovak population).
Monetary poverty improved after accession and then worsened as a
consequence of the crisis, though with a 13% rate it is still a bit better
than in Poland. In Hungary in 2013 one-third of the population, that
is 3.285 million people were at risk of poverty, which is amongst the
highest rates in the EU and higher than it was in 2005. Children under
6 years of age are even more affected: the rate in 2013 was 42.4%,
the highest since 2005 and the third highest rate in the EU after Bul-
garia and Romania. As regards material poverty, while the risk of
poverty rate before social transfers decreased from 29.4% to 26.3%
between 2005 and 2013, the poverty rate after social transfers in-
creased from 13.5% to 14.3%. Consequently, the share of the pop-
ulation whom social policy lifts out of material poverty in 2013 was
the lowest since 2005. The number of severely materially deprived
people increased from 2.3 million in 2005 to 2.6 million in 2013. 
Social welfare – social protection and social spending
A common issue for all V4 countries is how to eradicate poverty, to
support socially excluded strata and to finance social systems with
special regard to pensions and health care.  In all the V4 countries so-
cial expenditures as a percentage of GDP are below the EU average of
around 20%, the lowest being in Slovakia (12%) and the Czech Repub-
lic (13.8%). The main dilemma is how to increase social expenditures
while keeping public deficit under the threshold of 3% of the GDP.
Though retirement age is gradually increasing in all countries, further
steps are required to ensure the sustainability of the pension systems.
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In Poland expenditure on social protection increased during the
crisis and in 2011 it stood at 19.2% of GDP and almost 36.7% of
total government expenditure compared to the 29% and 40% aver-
ages of the EU27. The main sources of funding of social protection
at the EU27 level were social contributions (57.5%) and general gov-
ernment contributions (38.2%). The same figures for Poland were
42.8% and 34.6%, respectively.
In the Czech Republic budgetary expenditures on social protection
were 13.8% of the GDP in 2012 compared to the EU average of
19.9%. It is the second-lowest share in the Visegrad group. However,
if the calculation is made based on purchasing power standards, the
Czech Republic is in first place, providing the highest old age pension
among the Visegrad countries: in 2012 it was 1.649 euro (PPS)
monthly, while the EU average was 2.532 (PPS). 
In Slovakia a decreasing share of GDP is spent on social protection
(12% in 2012), indicating the lower engagement of the government
and providing an impetus for more efficient and targeted social pro-
tection programmes. Rising health care expenditures (6% of GDP in
2012) correspond to the long-term trend of an ageing population. The
number of health care facilities (hospitals, out-patient care units, etc.)
increased since accession. By contrast the number of beds available
decreased along with the number of patients, consequently the beds
per patient ratio increased a bit. The health care system is struggling
with a shortage of professionals, a deteriorating age structure due to
demographic reasons, lack of graduates and immigration to the Czech
Republic for higher salaries and better working conditions. 
In Hungary social protection expenditures were equal to 17.1% of
the GDP in 2012, which is the lowest since 2006 and substantially
lower than the EU27 average of 19.9% in 2012. Since 2004 the struc-
ture of social protection expenditures has changed at the expense of
the poorest people. While expenditures on pensions increased, the
amount devoted to sickness, disability, family and children, housing,
unemployment and social protection decreased.
As regards the healthcare system in Poland, citizens are granted
free access to publicly financed health facilities. In 2011 6.39% of
the GDP was spent on health, which is one of the lowest shares in
the EU. 70% of expenditures was financed by the public sector and
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30% by the private sector. As regards the number of practicing
physicians and nurses per 100,000 inhabitants, Poland was the only
EU country with a negative growth rate for doctors and very low fig-
ures compared to the EU average due to emigration, which causes
shortages of health care professionals. The situation with the number
of hospital beds is better.46
The Czech Republic is among those countries with lowest health-
care expenditure in the EU and it is in third place after Hungary and
Slovakia in the Visegrad group. Expenditures on health care have in-
creased gradually and reached 7.55% of the GDP. Public insurance
is compulsory for everybody with permanent residence, while private
spending on health care is increasing. However, the Czech Republic
is among those countries (even in the Visegrad group) with the lowest
rate of private spending. Despite the fact that expenditure on health-
care is among the lowest in the EU, people assess the quality of
healthcare positively. In some indicators (like doctors and beds per
inhabitants) the country exceeds the average EU level.
The biggest challenge for Slovakia is how to finance health care
and pension systems amidst the consolidation of its public finances
and keeping the public deficit under the threshold of 3% of GDP.
There is a pressing need for a comprehensive reform of the social
systems with special regard to pensions and health care. The rising
share of health care expenditures corresponds with the long-term
trend of an ageing population in Slovakia and highlights the need for
efficiency measures to be taken with regard to over-capacities and
standardisation of procedures.47
Because of the ageing society the biggest challenge for the V4
countries is how to finance their pension systems. In Poland 58%
(in the EU27 46%) of total social benefits (that is 11.6% of GDP) is
spent on pensions while the proportion of older people grows, all
while the number of persons of working age decreases. Recently
Poland introduced several reforms for mitigating long-term problems
and increasing financial stability. It was decided to gradually increase
statutory retirement age as of January 1, 2013 and to introduce a uni-
46 Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (2015)
47 Hošoff (2014b)
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form retirement age of 67 years. This decision is expected to increase
the labour supply and improve the balance of the public pension
fund. Other decisions were the radical change of the private pension
fund sector and the increase of the length of service for cases of early
retirement.
One of the biggest challenges for the future in the Czech Republic
is the sustainability of the pension system. The capital pension pillar
is voluntary and the state is not doing enough to motivate people to
use it extensively for securing their pensions. The on-going pension
system is already in deficit, whereby its revenues are lower than ex-
penditures. Sustainability of the pension system is also a problem in
the case of Slovakia. It has a need for comprehensive reform of the
pension system, because the Slovak Republic will became the
fastest ageing country in the EU. These trends signal a rather short
life for Slovak pensioners after retirement in comparison to other Eu-
ropean countries, highlighting the urgent need for proper develop-
ment and funding for health-care and social care for elderly systems.48
Unfavourable tendency, that because of the cutting government
expenditures in Hungary – which is a result of government expendi-
ture cuts – has seen expenditure on old age pensions decrease. Re-
nationalisation of the assets of the private pension funds provided
short-term sustainability to the system, but in the long term it has
caused unsustainability of the current level of the monthly allowances.
The cohesive and diverging forces of
the Visegrad cooperation – main
conclusion and recommendations
After EU accession – as one of the strategic goals of the V4 was ful-
filled – the need for Visegrad cooperation was questioned. The im-
pact of the 2008 financial and economic crisis – what has its effects
until now – brought to the surface the formerly existing structural
problems in the V4 countries. These issues and the debate on the
future of European integration give us the question what are the per-
spectives of this regional cooperation.
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358Table 2. SWOT analysis of the V4 countries’ social situation
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Relatively young population, low share of
elderly; decreasing unemployment; signif-
icant improvement in social inclusion;
outstanding performance in early school
leaving + tertiary education + PISA test;
relatively equal income distribution, de-
creasing Gini index; net recipient of remit-
tances; increasing expenditure on social
protection; free access to health care +
high coverage
Low fertility rate, declining + low popula-
tion growth rate, decreasing population,
lagging behind life expectancy, low life
expectancy after retirement; low employ-
ment rate, low labour force participation,
high youth unemployment, high unem-
ployment rate for people with higher edu-
cation; 10 million people are poor, high
poverty among women and young, high
monetary poverty rate; regional income
disparities; emigration overpasses immi-
gration; below EU expenditure on social
protection and health care; shortage of
health care professionals
Dynamic population;
high employment rate
target; further poverty
reduction; ambitious
target for tertiary educa-
tion; increasing mini-
mum wage; remittances
- revenue for families,
contribution to current
account balance; re-
forming the pension
system; promoting im-
migration 
Ageing society, low
labour supply, labour
shortage, massive emi-
gration; youth unem-
ployment; lack of
access of the poorest to
public transfers; re-
gional differences; brain
drain; wage pressure; fi-
nancing social protec-
tion and pension
system; impact of immi-
gration  
Relatively high convergence to the EU av-
erage in GDP per capita, the highest em-
ployment rate in V4, very low
unemployment, extremely low long term
unemployment (the lowest in the EU), well
functioning social protection – the lowest
level of population at risk of poverty and
social exclusion in the EU, highest old
age pension in V4, even distribution of in-
come, positive migration balance, low
level of early school leaving, lowest infant
mortality in the world, good quality of
healthcare, growing life expectancy
Low fertility rate, natural decrease of pop-
ulation, gender inequality in labour issues,
lack of childcare facilities, weak economic
growth, low share of people with tertiary
education, high number of students per
teacher in primary education, existence of
socially excluded strata and communities,
low health care expenditures,  low private
spending on health care
Positive migration flows,
higher labour activity of
women, increasing re-
tirement age, space for
increase of private
spending on healthcare
system, increasing num-
ber of inhabitants with
tertiary education, life-
long learning and skills
development, space for
increase of public
spending on social pro-
tection
Stronger natural de-
crease of population,
ageing society, decreas-
ing working age popula-
tion, growing
dependency ratio, sus-
tainability of the pension
system, shortage of
skilled labour force,
negative effects of mi-
gration, growing number
of socially excluded
communities
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Table 2. SWOT analysis of the V4 countries’ social situation
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Increasing/ stagnating popula-
tion, increasing working age pop-
ulation; immigration exceeds
emigration, migration is negligi-
ble; below average risk of poverty
in old age; increasing number of
health care facilities, increasing
health care efficiency, elimination
of overcapacities; high participa-
tion in early education, decreas-
ing ratio of students to teachers,
declining average class size,
good PISA-test results; relatively
low Gini coefficient; low and de-
creasing social exclusion rate; in-
creasing health care expenditures
Decreasing young population,
low fertility rate; unemployment
+ high unemployment rate for
people with higher education +
high regional differences; high
long term unemployment;  no
positive remittance balance; low
life expectancy after retirement;
decreasing number of hospital
beds + deteriorating age struc-
ture in health care; drop in pri-
mary school attendance +
decreasing student number in
tertiary education; situation of
the Roma population; decreasing
social expenditures
Labour force supply depends on
immigration; fertility rate can be
increased via pro-family policy;
immigration can be promoted;
retirement age can be increased;
cross-border cooperation may
decrease unemployment and re-
gional differences; wages can be
increased for retaining labour
force; studying abroad might de-
crease youth unemployment; re-
forming social protection system
(health care and pension) 
Decreasing population size with-
out immigration; fastest ageing
society - increasing dependency
ratio; low retirement age; lack of
young people; decreasing pro-
ductive population; labour short-
age; mismatch between
education and employability; re-
gional differences in unemploy-
ment; 
shortage of health care profes-
sionals; brain drain; financing so-
cial protection systems
(pensions + health care)
Improving labour market indica-
tors, decreasing unemployment
in the last years, high participa-
tion rate in education, slightly in-
creasing students to teachers
ratio, below EU average early
school leavers rate
Decreasing population, declining
birth rate, high share of long
term unemployment, rising youth
unemployment, cutting budget
on unemployment benefits, de-
creasing consumption and in-
come, “perverse redistribution”
of income, high rate of poverty,
especially among children; low
social protection expenditures,
decreasing government spend-
ing on education  
Improving labour market situa-
tion, active labour market meas-
ures can be strengthened,
remittances can improve current
account balance + family rev-
enue, promoting immigration
might counterbalance population
decrease, training and education
of unemployed 
Ageing society, increasing em-
ployment via public work pro-
grammes, decreasing number of
job seekers, cutting unemploy-
ment (social) benefits, lack of ac-
tive labour market measures, flat
income tax favours the highest
wage earners, one third of the
population is poor, increasing in-
equalities, brain drain, worsening
conditions in education and
health care, shortage of health
care professionals
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The main objective of our research was to analyse the main politi-
cal, economic and social trends in order to attempt to reveal those
cohesive forces that lead to deeper cooperation and to uncover
those diverging forces that might weaken cooperation. Due to the
complexity of the problem it was not an easy task. Based on the his-
tory of the cooperation it can be stated that the shared problems or
tasks (EU and NATO accession, energy policy, infrastructure devel-
opment) strengthen the cohesive forces and push the V4 to deepen
the cooperation. On the other side, lack of financial funding, joint pro-
grams and week institutionalisation can only result in articulating
some common interests (e.g. North-South infrastructure corridor).
There are three “levels” of the cooperation. The most visible is the
political side because common statements are always high on the
agenda. However, the global financial and economic crisis brought
such opportunities and problems to the surface that bring a new di-
mension into the cooperation. The most robust centrifugal forces
have derived from the crisis, the national and EU-level crisis
management. In order to overcome the crisis, Poland continued and
the other three Visegrad countries started to follow an inward look-
ing economic policy which works against enhanced cooperation. It
became obvious that because of its large internal market, Poland has
more possibilities to sustain and create economic development. The
other three V4 countries are highly dependent on external markets,
mainly on the demand of the EU countries – despite the fact that
through the global value chain their exports are being re-exported to
the global markets – therefore the recession in the whole EU has
forced them to find individual ways to sell their products. 
This reorientation of their external relations (towards e.g. Russia,
Ukraine, China and Turkey) beyond the boundaries of the EU loos-
ened their internal trade relations. Also, the economic crisis led to
decreasing demand, and competition for the shrinking markets be-
came keener within the EU and among the V4 countries; strengthen-
ing the centrifugal forces among the V4 countries. Furthermore, there
is a competition for foreign direct investment that had a declining
trend during the crisis, triggering a strong competition in this field
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among the resource-poor V4 countries. On the political side, the dif-
ferences are more visible and detectable than on the economic side.
Not only currently, but in the long term too, the debate about the fu-
ture of the EU and the relations with Russia could weaken the cohe-
sion among the V4 countries. The differing position of the V4 is
determined by their economic and political situation along with their
national, regional and EU-level aspirations. First of all, as regards the
EU level, the Union has initiated a great number of crisis manage-
ment methods and instruments which were not supported by all the
V4 countries and/or not all the V4 countries were involved. One can
see that the four countries had different attitudes towards these
steps, consequently there was not much cooperation among them
when formulating their position. The same is true in connection with
the future of the EU too, with due regard to economic governance
and deepening the integration. While Poland is for strengthening eco-
nomic governance and for full economic, monetary and political
union, the Czech Republic and Hungary are rather (euro)
sceptical/critical, whereas Slovakia as a eurozone member is already
deeper integrated. Also, there is no consensus among the three non-
eurozone Visegrad countries about the introduction of the euro either,
even though coordinated preparations and joint introduction of the
single currency would be clearly beneficial for the regional economic
and trade relations. 
Due to their different development levels and challenges, the V4
countries pursue different development strategies. That could be
seen in the debate about the future of the cohesion policy and agri-
cultural subsidies (even if they were united in the ‘friends of cohesion’
group). Regarding the decision-making on different EU issues and
policies, the V4 countries make alliances not by their geographical
position – i.e. Central European countries – but according to shared
interests in given topics with any EU member states concerned. This
can also be perceived as a factor weakening the agreement. Regard-
ing global issues, increasing Russian interests could redraw the bal-
ance of power in the former socialist block countries as well as in the
V4. Recently, the V4 countries are mostly divided by their foreign pol-
icy vis-à-vis Russia with special regard to the present conflict in
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Ukraine: Poland has a strong Trans-Atlantic commitment, the Czech
Republic is very critical, while Hungary and Slovakia have a prag-
matic approach. No common position on Russia is expected due to
the V4 countries’ differing history, interests and energy supply vul-
nerability.
Table 3. Factors that strengthen and weaken the V4 cooperation
It seems that the social situation and trends are the least visible in
the case of the regional cooperation. However, in the 21st century,
social conflicts do not stay within the state borders (see the illegal
immigration trend into the EU). Social welfare is also a key to a sus-
tainable and competitive socio-economic development. Just to men-
tion the most challenging ones: declining population and ageing
society, long-term sustainability of the social and welfare systems
(pension, health care and other social care) or the lack of workforce
in maintaining the economic development. Organised immigration
may be a key factor for all V4 countries. Other competitiveness fac-
tors such as activity rate and educational systems are also important
for a successful catching-up. This issue drew our attention to another
Converging (strengthening) factors Diverging (weakening) factors
Harmonious post-crisis growth trends
Narrowing of the development
gap among V4
Non-adherence to the euro 
area by PL, CZ, HU
Public finance stabilisation, convergence 
of monetary indicators
Different approaches/attitudes 
vis-à-vis EU governance changes
Post-crisis improvement of several 
macroeconomic indicators
Different interests/attitudes 
vis-à-vis Russia
Openness of the four economies
Different levels of exposure 
to external markets
Deepening integration into
global value chains
Insufficient interconnectedness 
of infrastructure networks 
Representation of some common
interests at the EU level 
(e.g. cohesion policy, energy issues)
Lack of mechanisms for harmonising
positions on key EU issues
Potential to coordinate parts of the
135 billion euro EU assistance flowing 
into the region between 2014-2020
Lack of platforms for regularly exchanging
best practices on public finance consolida-
tion or EU funds absorption, etc.
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important problem, namely that without a redesigned social welfare
system the region will lag behind. Furthermore, the V4 countries have
to tackle the gaps in regional unemployment and focus efforts on re-
gions struggling with high joblessness. In connection to this, the cur-
rent situation of the Roma minority anticipates increasing social
tensions and migration problems as well.
While the above summarised centrifugal forces do deteriorate V4
cooperation, some emerging centripetal forces might work in the
other direction. It is obvious from the list, that the factors pushing for
a stronger cooperation are shorter than the diverging factors. The
ground for further cooperation is provided by the Visegrad countries’
continued convergence to the EU based on which they should be
able to articulate and represent common interests more systemati-
cally. Good examples of shared positions in some EU policies in-
clude the already mentioned cohesion policy, interconnection of
transport and energy networks, Eastern partnership, increasing com-
petitiveness, job creation, fostering economic growth, energy secu-
rity, or the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
At this point we have to ask, do we want more from the Visegrad
cooperation besides strengthening the political and cultural cohe-
sion? Without any joint instrument (except for the International Viseg-
rad Fund), an independent and supranational organisation, and
without any common budget all economic cooperation will be only
under the umbrella of the funds of the European Union. Therefore the
future of Visegrad cooperation will be shaped by – beside the in-
terplay of the above mentioned centripetal and centrifugal forces –
the institutionalisation of the agreement. A firm ground for coopera-
tion is provided by the continued convergence to EU averages, re-
covering from the crisis and harmonious development at V4 level. In
order to enhance cooperation, national interests should be har-
monised with regional, V4 level ones with due regard to the de-
velopments of the EU. Our recommendations regarding the main
fields of enhanced cooperation should be the following:
a) In relation to the EU, the V4 should be able to formulate at least
the principal common guidelines vis-à-vis the future governance
structures. A basis for V4 cooperation in shaping the future of Eu-
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ropean integration should be the closing of the EU’s legitimacy
gap via strengthening both input and output legitimacy. Reinforc-
ing input legitimacy means the strengthening of the democratic
aspects and fostering the emergence of a European demos via
bringing the EU closer to its citizens. Strengthening output legiti-
macy entails the reinforced use of subsidiarity, that is, the EU
should focus on policy areas which really matter for citizens
(mostly issues of a cross-border dimension). It could be a good
strategy for the V4 countries to push for more input and output le-
gitimacy before any treaty change is put in the agenda..
b) In relation to high politics, the Visegrad platform should be used
for exchanging ideas and coordinating their positions in some in-
ternational problems (such as migration, conflict in Ukraine).
c) The three bigger countries should harmonise their strategies to
joining together the euro area. They should use the Visegrad plat-
form for exchanging best practices as regards both nominal and
real convergence. 
d) The V4 should coordinate investment projects and public procure-
ments linked to EU funds, in order to expand the possible (cross-
border) cooperation. To this end, some harmonisation of major
objectives of their national development programmes might be
useful. 
e) Finding solutions to common economic and social problems and
exchanging best practices thereof would also be important. Here
the issues to be covered could include increasing competitiveness
and productivity, financing innovation, decreasing regional differ-
ences, accelerating EU funds' absorption, curbing corruption,
combating tax evasion, attempting at some tax harmonisation,
whitening black and grey economies, increasing youth employ-
ment, promoting labour force mobility, reforming pension and
health care systems while keeping public deficit under the 3%
threshold, stopping population decline primarily via pro-family
policies, strengthening social inclusion.
f) In a policy-based approach, major fields of substantive coopera-
tion could be: energy security (e.g. building transmission infra-
structure), transport and infrastructure (building international rail
freight corridors and road infrastructure within the Trans-European
Prospects of the Visegrad cooperation in changing economic...
Transport Network, construction of joined waterways), environ-
ment, food safety, innovation (establishment of a “V4 innovation
centre”), cross-border cooperation and migration. 
Even if all the obstacles to enhanced cooperation are eliminated
and all possibilities are utilised, the V4 will still remain only a supple-
ment to the EU as the main anchor of development. However, if the
cooperation is used to its full potential, it can contribute to the suc-
cessful EU membership of the countries concerned. 
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